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There have been many calls for a rebalancing of investor protection and state 
sovereignty in the investment treaty system. However, another equally important shift 
is underway: the recalibration of interpretive authority between treaty parties and 
arbitral tribunals. In newer-style investment treaties, states are increasingly protecting 
and enhancing their role in interpreting and applying their treaties.  
 
Older-style investment treaties were typically highly protective of investors’ rights, 
providing little express recognition of the need to safeguard host states’ regulatory 
authority. These treaties shifted considerable interpretive power from treaty parties to 
investor-state tribunals because they empowered tribunals to interpret and apply broad 
and vague treaty terms. Arbitral tribunals gave content to these treaty provisions and 
referenced each other’s awards as persuasive authority. As a result, much of the 
content of investment treaties was forged by tribunals, often in ways going beyond the 
intentions of the treaty parties.  
 
Newer style investment treaties evidence two important shifts: (1) a substantive 
rebalancing of investor protection and state sovereignty; and (2) a procedural 
recalibration of interpretive power between investor-state tribunals and treaty parties. 
As much has been written about the first development, I focus here on the second, 
which is taking place in at least four ways.1 
 
First, states are increasing the specificity of their treaty commitments by defining 
vague protections (e.g., indirect expropriation), specifying the relationship between 
treaty commitments and custom (e.g., fair and equitable treatment and the minimum 
standard of treatment) and including exceptions clauses. 2  The more “rule-like” a 
treaty prescription, the more treaty parties decide ex ante what categories of behavior 
are acceptable and unacceptable; the more ‘‘standard-like’’ the prescription, the more 
often this determination is left to be made ex post by investment tribunals. These 
newer-style treaties evidence a shift on the standards-to-rule spectrum, though many 
of the clarifications remain vague and open-ended compared to more rule-based 
regimes like international trade law.  
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Second, many states are including interpretive mechanisms that permit treaty parties 
to provide an interpretation of the treaty that is binding on investor-state tribunals.3 
The most famous example is NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission, which the NAFTA 
parties used to clarify the content of NAFTA’s fair and equitable treatment provision 
and its relationship with custom. Even without such a mechanism, the subsequent 
agreements and practices of treaty parties are relevant to interpretation, though it is 
unclear whether these are binding or merely persuasive.4 Treaty parties are building 
on this general international law right by expressly providing for it in their treaties 
and declaring that these interpretations will be binding.5  
 
Third, states are increasingly including provisions permitting non-disputing treaty 
parties to make submissions on interpretation in investor-state disputes.6 Submitting 
pleadings is an important way to influence the interpretation of treaty provisions in a 
particular case. Pleadings by respondent states and non-disputing treaty parties are 
also evidence of state practice, so they may be relevant in influencing the 
interpretation of treaty provisions outside the confines of the particular case.  
 
Finally, many states are giving host states individually or treaty parties collectively 
the power to determine certain sensitive issues. For instance, some states are 
specifying that exceptions clauses to protect their essential security interests are self-
judging.7 Other states are including provisions on taxation or financial services that 
provide for a joint determination by the competent financial authorities of the treaty 
parties that can either prevent arbitration or bind the arbitral tribunal. 8  In other 
treaties, the investor-state tribunal cannot decide certain defenses but must defer 
instead to an agreement by the treaty parties or, failing that, a ruling by a state-to-state 
tribunal.9  
 
In 2011, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development issued a paper 
arguing that “[a]s masters of their [treaties], States can be more proactive in asserting 
their interpretive authority to guide tribunals towards a proper and predictable reading 
of IIA provisions” by playing a more active role in drafting investment treaties, 
participating in investor-state disputes as non-disputing parties, and issuing 
interpretive declarations.10 States are beginning to do just that and, in the process, 
they are recalibrating interpretive authority in the investment treaty field.   
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